Does corporate social responsibility engagement benefit distressed firms? The role of moral and exchange capital  by Gupta, Kartick & Krishnamurti, Chandrasekhar
Paciﬁc-Basin Finance Journal xxx (2016) xxx–xxx
PACFIN-00892; No of Pages 14
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Paciﬁc-Basin Finance Journal
j ourna l homepage: www.e lsev ie r .com/ locate /pacf inDoes corporate social responsibility engagement beneﬁt distressed ﬁrms? The
role of moral and exchange capital
Kartick Gupta a, Chandrasekhar Krishnamurti b,⁎
a University of South Australia, Adelaide 5000, South Australia, Australia
b University of Southern Queensland, Toowoomba, QLD, 4350/University of South Australia, Adelaide, South Australia, 5000, Australiaa r t i c l e i n f o⁎ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: Kartick.gupta@unisa.edu.au (K. Gu
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pacﬁn.2016.10.010
0927-538X/© 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Please cite this article as: Gupta, K., Krishnam
role of moral and exchange capital, Paciﬁc-a b s t r a c tArticle history:
Received 9 July 2016
Received in revised form 2 October 2016
Accepted 25 October 2016
Available online xxxxExtant literature supports the view that Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) engagement
could potentially act as a risk mitigation device. We extend this literature to address the
issue of whether CSR engagement could beneﬁt ﬁrms which are already in bankruptcy. A
unique feature of our empirical tests is the decomposition of CSR into two components –
moral capital and exchange capital. We ﬁnd that moral capital is associated with the likelihood
of a distressed ﬁrm emerging from bankruptcy. Further, moral capital appears to reduce the
number of days a distressed ﬁrm spends in bankruptcy. Our empirical evidence also suggests
that moral capital increases the likelihood that a distressed ﬁrm successfully negotiates a
pre-packaged agreement with its creditors. Finally, our empirical results indicate that the ex-
change capital component of CSR is positively related to the probability of procuring debtor-
in-possession ﬁnancing by a distressed ﬁrm whilst in bankruptcy. Overall, our results imply
that both moral and exchange capital components of CSR play a role in facilitating a ﬁrm's
emergence from bankruptcy.
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Increasingly, institutional investors are adopting environmental, social and governance standards, which are collectively re-
ferred to as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), in their investment decisions (Cheng et al., 2014). Researchers have examined
CSR engagement in the corporate sector through different lenses. First, the duty-aligned perspective posited by Swanson (1995)
suggests that corporate moral behavior may be expressed by obligations and duties derived on the basis of rights and justice
without regard to a utilitarian assessment. Second, ﬁrms follow a utilitarian perspective and implement CSR initiatives to achieve
performance objectives such as enhancing proﬁtability, returns on investment or sales growth. Some scholars label this as the
strategic view of CSR, which maintains that ﬁrms engage in proﬁt maximizing CSR (Baron, 2001; McWilliams and Siegel, 2001)
and that companies “do well by doing good.” Finally, the stakeholder-driven view proposes that corporations adopt social respon-
sibility activities in response to pressures from various stakeholders. In a meta-analysis, there is mixed evidence on whether or
not CSR is value-enhancing (Freeman, 1984; Orlitzky et al., 2003; Margolis and Walsh, 2003).
More recently, a strand of research has emerged which suggests that a ﬁrm's CSR activities may be used to mitigate its risk.
Attig et al. (2013) suggest three channels for the CSR-risk linkage. First, by improving a ﬁrm's relations with its stakeholders, a
ﬁrm enhances the long-term sustainability of the ﬁrm. Second, by engaging in CSR activities, a ﬁrm signals efﬁcient use of itspta), Chandrasekhar.krishnamurti@usq.edu.au (C. Krishnamurti).
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irresponsible behavior. In line with their postulations, Attig et al. (2013) show a positive linkage between CSR activities of a
ﬁrm and its credit rating. Kim et al. (2014) ﬁnd that CSR mitigates stock price crash risk. They attribute this ﬁnding to the greater
level of ﬁnancial reporting transparency of socially responsible ﬁrms and less bad news hoarding behavior. Sun and Cui (2014)
ﬁnd a negative relationship between the level of CSR engagement of a ﬁrm and its default risk. Their ﬁnding is consistent with
the Resource Based Theory (RBT) since CSR stabilizes the ﬁnancial performance of a ﬁrm by enhancing corporate image and rep-
utation (Carter, 2005). Further, Godfrey et al. (2009) propose that when negative events occur, stakeholders will punish a ﬁrm
with high CSR less than comparable low CSR ﬁrms, resulting in lower loss of revenues. Finally, Branco and Rodrigues (2006)
claim that engaging in socially beneﬁcial activities builds closer relationships with governments and communities resulting in
more favorable contract terms when required. Goss and Roberts (2011) ﬁnd that ﬁrms with below average CSR performance
pay between 8 and 17 basis points more for their bank loans. Thus, banks respond to CSR concerns of ﬁrms by offering less fa-
vorable terms.
Although there are numerous studies that link CSR with ﬁnancial performance, there is no research studying the impact of CSR
engagement on ﬁrms in ﬁnancial distress. What is the role of prior CSR engagement? Does a ﬁrm beneﬁt by showing itself to be a
good corporate citizen? Or do stakeholders ignore good corporate citizenship when it comes at the cost of basic survival? It is not
clear ex-ante whether a ﬁrm's socially responsible behavior will facilitate its emergence from bankruptcy. Given the lack of prior
work, we therefore examine this issue empirically. We investigate four non-mutually exclusive aspects of CSR effects. First, we
examine whether CSR engagement explains a ﬁrm's emergence from bankruptcy. Second, we investigate whether CSR impacts
the time spent by a distressed ﬁrm in bankruptcy. Third, we study whether CSR engagement explains the probability of a distress-
ed ﬁrm in closing a prenegotiated settlement with its creditors. Finally, we consider the impact of CSR engagement on the prob-
ability of obtaining debtor-in-possession (DIP) ﬁnancing by a distressed ﬁrm.
A unique feature of our paper is the segmentation of CSR engagement into two components – exchange capital and moral cap-
ital based on Godfrey (2005) and Mattingly and Berman (2006). CSR activities targeting primary stakeholders are labelled as ex-
change capital since it facilitates the potential to generate beneﬁcial exchanges between the ﬁrm and its primary stakeholders.
CSR activities directed at secondary stakeholders are labelled as moral capital. We argue that moral and exchange capital play
complementary roles in the context of a bankrupt ﬁrm. Our work examines the relative efﬁcacy of moral and exchange capital
components of CSR in facilitating a distressed ﬁrm to successfully emerge from bankruptcy.
Although the theoretical underpinnings of our paper are based on the work of Godfrey (2005), our empirical tests are carried
out under a different setting than Godfrey et al. (2009). Godfrey et al. (2009) examined negative events such as the initiation of a
lawsuit by a customer, third party or competitor, or the announcement of regulatory action including investigations, ﬁnes and
penalties by a government entity. Our negative event is the ﬁling of corporate bankruptcy under Chapter 11. The dependent var-
iable used by Godfrey et al. (2009) is the 2-day abnormal stock return following the public disclosure of the negative event. Our
primary variable of interest is the emergence of a distressed ﬁrm from Chapter 11 proceedings. Thus the window over which we
expect a ﬁrm's CSR engagement to work is over a longer-term. In the setting of Godfrey et al. (2009), shareholders are the pri-
mary stakeholders who are expected to respond to a ﬁrm's moral and exchange capital. In our setting, the relevant stakeholders
include shareholders, creditors, employees, suppliers, and customers.
We conduct our empirical investigations by matching US ﬁrms with available CSR scores from the MSCI ESG database1 with
the UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research database over the 1992 to 2014 period. We ﬁnd that CSR engagement is positively asso-
ciated with the likelihood of a distressed ﬁrm successfully emerging from bankruptcy. On further examination, we observe that it
is the moral capital component of CSR that explains a distressed ﬁrm's emergence from bankruptcy. Exchange capital is not asso-
ciated with the probability of a distressed ﬁrm's emergence from bankruptcy. Further, we ﬁnd that moral capital is also associated
with a decrease in the number of days spent by a distressed ﬁrm in bankruptcy. We also ﬁnd that CSR engagement is positively
associated with the likelihood of a distressed ﬁrm concluding a prenegotiated settlement with its creditors and this association
results mainly from the moral capital component of CSR. Finally, we ﬁnd that CSR engagement has an impact on the prospect
of a ﬁrm obtaining DIP. Since DIP ﬁnancing is a major determinant of a ﬁrm's emergence from bankruptcy, this ﬁnding is of sig-
niﬁcant importance to several key stakeholders of distressed ﬁrms. The exchange capital component of CSR is associated with the
probability of securing DIP ﬁnancing while the moral capital is not signiﬁcant.
In summary, our results suggest that CSR engagement has signiﬁcant impact on distressed ﬁrms in bankruptcy. CSR engage-
ment explains the probabilities of a ﬁrm emerging from bankruptcy, concluding a prenegotiated settlement with its creditors, se-
curing DIP ﬁnancing and reduces the time spent in bankruptcy. Both components of CSR – moral and exchange play a role in
helping a distressed ﬁrm emerge from bankruptcy.
The rest of the article proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the Literature Review and develop the hypotheses used in
our empirical tests based on the theoretical underpinnings suggesting a CSR-risk management link. We also develop our main hy-
potheses on the relation between CSR components and emergence from bankruptcy of distressed ﬁrms. In Section 3, we describe
our data, the methodology employed and the measurement of key variables used in in this study. In Section 4, we report our em-
pirical results. In the ﬁnal section, we offer our concluding remarks.1 MSCI bought the Kinder Lydenberg Domini (KLD) database in 2010. Several published research papers use the KLD database.
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In this section, we argue that a ﬁrm's CSR engagement acts like an insurance policy in mitigating the adverse effects of destruc-
tion of relational wealth during bankruptcy enabling it to emerge successfully bankruptcy.
Mattingly and Berman (2006) performed exploratory factor analysis on KLD dataset (now MSCI ESG) on social ratings and un-
covered two distinct components of CSR which they label as institutional CSR and technical CSR. Technical CSR is directed at the
primary stakeholders of a ﬁrm and incorporates the governance, employee relations and product related issues. Institutional CSR
(ICSR) encompasses the elements of community engagement and diversity and is directed at a ﬁrm's secondary stakeholders. ICSR
is also alternately labelled as moral capital while technical CSR is alternately referred to as exchange capital.
According to Godfrey (2005), moral capital acts as an insurance policy protecting a ﬁrm's relational wealth especially when a
ﬁrm faces adverse consequence of bad actions. In the context of corporate bankruptcy, the relation based intangible assets of a
ﬁrm are likely to be destroyed. This is because a group of stakeholders, such as employees, communities, regulators, customers,
suppliers and creditors have incentives to forsake the ﬁrm in order to protect their own interests (Brown and Matsa, 2012;
Graham et al., 2013; Shleifer and Vishny, 1992; Titman, 1984).
Godfrey (2005) argues that moral capital may potentially mitigate negative stakeholder actions when bad acts occur. Godfrey
(2005) invokes the common law tradition of criminal law using the concept of mens rea to explain the role of moral capital in
protecting a ﬁrm's relational wealth. Under the common law tradition, a bad act and a bad mind (mens rea) must both be present
for an offence to occur. Further, he argues that moral capital acts as a signal to indicate the absence of mens rea.
The ﬁling for bankruptcy protection is an example of a negative event in which the ﬁrm including its managers caused poten-
tial negative outcomes for key stakeholder groups. This is because the ﬁling of bankruptcy protection adversely affects the welfare
of several stakeholders such as creditors, employees and shareholders. However, what remains contentious is the underlying mo-
tivations of the concerned managers. Did the bankruptcy ﬁling result from the actions of malevolent, self-serving senior execu-
tives? Alternatively, was the bankruptcy ﬁling an outcome of the maladroit handling of a business situation? Using the lens of
mens rea, in the ﬁrst instance, bad actors caused a bad act while in the second case, good actors got entangled in a bad situation.
Enron's bankruptcy ﬁling in 2001 is an example of the former. The ﬁling of bankruptcy by Eastman Kodak in 2012 is an example
of the latter. Kodak's failure has been attributed to their relatively slow shift to the digital age.
In the context of bankruptcy, drawing upon Godfrey's framework, we argue that positive moral capital signals the lack of a bad
mind. Therefore, we posit that a ﬁrm with positive moral capital is likely to protect its relational wealth better resulting in con-
tinued stakeholder engagement with the ﬁrm, enabling it to emerge successfully from bankruptcy. This is because sustained en-
gagement of stakeholders is valuable to a ﬁrm during bankruptcy and will therefore increase its chances of survival.
We therefore posit the following:
Hypothesis 1. In the context of a corporate bankruptcy ﬁling, a ﬁrm with positive moral capital is more likely to emerge from
bankruptcy, ceteris paribus.
Bankruptcy costs are generally categorized into direct and indirect costs (Kalay et al., 2007). Direct costs comprise of ﬁling,
legal, and professional fees and have been assessed to be about 3% of the market value of the pre-ﬁling assets for large ﬁrms
(Bris et al., 2006). Indirect bankruptcy costs generally include the lost proﬁts of foregone sales, the costs of asset ﬁre sales, and
the costs of distortions to a ﬁrm's investment and ﬁnancing policies during the period of distress (Kaplan, 1994; Pulvino, 1999;
Bris et al., 2006). Researchers generally suggest that ex ante indirect bankruptcy costs are substantial while direct bankruptcy
costs are small.
We expect that moral capital generated by CSR engagement will mitigate the adverse impact of bankruptcy ﬁling. For instance,
we expect the indirect costs of bankruptcy will be mitigated when a ﬁrm has accumulated moral capital. This is because of con-
tinued engagement of stakeholders who are assured by a lack of mens rea. We therefore posit that the cost of bankruptcy will be
smaller for ﬁrms that engage in CSR activities that generate moral capital compared to ﬁrms that do not.
Extant evidence indicates that the time spent in bankruptcy (Chapter 11) is a proxy for direct and indirect costs. Lawless and
Ferris (2000) ﬁnd that each additional year in bankruptcy costs the ﬁrm 2.2% of the total distribution in the bankruptcy. Further,
Bris et al. (2006) and Singhal and Zhu (2013) argue that indirect bankruptcy costs are proxied by the time spent in Chapter 11.
This is because the negative effects of bankruptcy on a ﬁrm's position in the capital and product markets are expected to increase
with the time spent in the bankruptcy process. For instance, a bankrupt ﬁrm may lose value due to difﬁculties in raising capital,
retaining customers and employees, and investing in value-enhancing new projects the longer it remains under Chapter 11.
We therefore posit:
Hypothesis 2. In the context of a corporate bankruptcy ﬁling, the time spent in bankruptcy will be shorter for ﬁrms that engage
in CSR activities that generate moral capital compared to ﬁrms that do not, ceteris paribus.
In a traditional Chapter 11 bankruptcy ﬁling, the ﬁrm ﬁrst ﬁles for bankruptcy and then puts together a reorganization plan
which must then be negotiated with concerned stakeholders. In a prepackaged bankruptcy, which grew in popularity during
the 1990s, the ﬁrm simultaneously ﬁles both the bankruptcy petition and the reorganization plan. Prepackaged bankruptcies
allow ﬁrms to ﬁle for bankruptcy with a reorganization plan previously negotiated with creditors. This arrangement decreases
the time the ﬁrm spends in bankruptcy, a period during which the ﬁrm's operations are less efﬁcient and a loss in ﬁrm value oc-
curs (Betker, 1995; Carapeto, 2005).Please cite this article as: Gupta, K., Krishnamurti, C., Does corporate social responsibility engagement beneﬁt distressedﬁrms? The
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1996). Further, prepacks reduce both the time and costs associated with staying in bankruptcy. Extant evidence shows that
prepacks have lower direct costs than traditional Chapter 11 proceedings (Dahiya et al., 2003; Evans et al., 2014). Also, indirect
costs of staying in bankruptcy, which include the costs of losing customers, employees and suppliers, are reduced in the case
of a ﬁrm ﬁling for prepackaged bankruptcy instead of a traditional Chapter 11.
The cost of negotiation may be exacerbated when certain creditors hold out in hopes of getting a better deal. This is described
as the holdout problem in the bankruptcy literature. For successfully concluding a prepack, all creditors need to agree to the de-
tails of the proposed deal (Carapeto, 2005, 2007). In this context, we argue that a ﬁrm with accumulated moral capital is more
likely to negotiate a prepack as its stakeholders are convinced that the ﬁrm's managers did not have bad intent in the events lead-
ing up to ﬁling for bankruptcy. Therefore, they are more likely to conclude a prepack deal rather than hold out for a better deal.
We therefore postulate the following:
Hypothesis 3. In the context of a corporate bankruptcy ﬁling, ﬁrms that engage in CSR activities that generate moral capital are
more likely to ﬁle a prepackaged plan at the time of ﬁling for Chapter 11 compared to ﬁrms that do not, ceteris paribus.
A critical element that has a substantial bearing on the successful emergence of a ﬁrm from Chapter 11 is the ability to obtain
additional ﬁnancing during the period of restructuring. In US bankruptcy parlance this is known as DIP ﬁnancing. DIP ﬁnancing is
pervasive and should be court approved. Extant evidence is consistent with the view that ﬁrms receiving DIP ﬁnancing are able to
resolve their Chapter 11 ﬁling sooner than ﬁrms without access to DIP ﬁnancing (Dahiya et al., 2003). In the US, DIP ﬁnancing is
governed by Section 364 of the bankruptcy code. The main objective of DIP ﬁnancing is to facilitate funding to a ﬁnancially dis-
tressed ﬁrm in order to enable it to emerge successfully from bankruptcy and survive as a going concern. The court may authorize
DIP credit with a superpriority status. Filing for DIP ﬁnancing activates the “automatic stay” provision that stays the pre-petition
lenders' contractual and legal rights as long as DIP loan is outstanding. Although ﬁnancing a distressed ﬁrm is risky, due to these
special provisions, DIP ﬁnancing is widely prevalent (Chatterjee et al., 2004).
Further, DIP lenders are able to monitor the ﬁrms better on account of covenants typically used in this form of lending. Afﬁr-
mative covenants specify actions that the ﬁrm must comply and include ﬁnancial reporting and associated activities. Negative cov-
enants restrict speciﬁc operating decisions of the ﬁrm and may include investments in long-term projects, sale of assets etc. These
covenants reduce the information asymmetry between the ﬁrm's managers and the lenders and preclude the overinvestment
problem alluded to by Bebchuk and Fried (1996) and Warren (1996).
A crucial issue here is whether CSR engagement facilitates the procurement of DIP ﬁnancing by ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms.
Does CSR engagement provide insurance-like protection and expedite access to DIP ﬁnancing? If so, which component(s) of
CSR activities enable procurement of DIP funds? In the context of DIP ﬁnancing, we argue that exchange capital is more important
than moral capital in the successful procurement of funding arrangements. Since exchange capital focusses on primary stake-
holders and includes activities such as employee relations, governance, and product relations and since they possess power, ur-
gency, and legitimacy, following Godfrey et al. (2009), we argue that they generate the potential to create beneﬁcial
exchanges.2 In other words, successful engagements with employees, good governance and sound relations with customers are
essential for the ﬁrm to continue as a going concern. Therefore, ﬁrms with weak exchange capital are unlikely to obtain DIP ﬁ-
nancing. We also argue that moral capital is unimportant for DIP ﬁnancing due to the extra protection given to the creditors in
the form of superpriority status and other protective covenants. Further since stakeholders other than creditors do not play a
role in DIP ﬁnancing, moral capital which arises from community engagement and support for diversity is not a relevant factor.
We therefore postulate:
Hypothesis 4. In the context of a corporate bankruptcy ﬁling, ﬁrms that engage in CSR activities that generate exchange capital
are more likely to obtain DIP ﬁnancing compared to ﬁrms that do not, ceteris paribus.3. Data and methodology
3.1. Bankruptcy database
Our main source of bankruptcy cases are from UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database (BRD), provided by Professor Lynn
LoPucki for the period 1979 to 2014. This database has been used extensively in other studies (see Jiang et al., 2012; Evans et al.,
2014; Graham et al., 2011 among others) and has been closely scrutinized for data accuracy. The database contains more than
one-thousand large US public companies that have ﬁled for bankruptcy since October 1, 1979 with assets of at least $100 million
(measured in 1980 dollars) in the last pre-bankruptcy 10-K ﬁling. In Table 1, we provide sample description that includes both
bankruptcy information and CSR score. We start with 1008 bankruptcy cases provided by BRD. We remove the bankruptcy
cases that are still pending (12 cases) and dismissed by the court (20 cases) as of December 2014. We are also unable to ﬁnd
the CUSIP identiﬁer of 14 bankruptcy cases. Finally, as the BRD database contains bankruptcy cases information from 1979 on-
wards and MSCI ESG coverage only begins in 1992, we exclude bankruptcy cases prior to 1991.2 The idea of stakeholder salience being related to power, urgency and legitimacy is attributable toMitchell et al. (1997).We thank the referee for pointing this out to
us.
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Table 1
Sample selection.
Bankruptcy cases recorded in UCLA database 1008
Less: Drop cases that are Chapter 7 at ﬁling 20
Less: CUSIP Identiﬁer not available 14
Less: Cases still pending 12
Less: Cases before 1991 159
803
Matching LoPucki & MSCI ESG Score Last Year 101
Matching LoPucki & MSCI ESG Score Last Two Years 157
Matching LoPucki & MSCI ESG Score Last Three Years 183
In Table 1, we provide sample description that includes both bankruptcy information and CSR score. We start with 1008 bankruptcy cases provided by BRD. We
remove the bankruptcy cases that are still pending (12 cases) and dismissed by the court (20 cases) as of December 2014. We are also unable to ﬁnd the CUSIP
identiﬁer of 14 bankruptcy cases. Finally, as the BRD database contains bankruptcy cases information from 1979 onwards and MSCI ESG coverage begins in 1992,
we exclude bankruptcy cases prior to 1991. We ﬁnd that 101 bankruptcy cases have CSR score available in the last year. This number increases to 183 if we include
bankruptcy cases that have CSR score in any of the last three years.
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ruptcy cases that have CSR score in any of the previous three years. To further verify the accuracy of the data, we cross-check the
bankruptcy ﬁles with the list of ﬁrms in Bankruptcy Data Source database (www.bankruptcydata.com) maintained by New
Generation Research (NGR). This database holds information on bankruptcy cases of publicly listed companies with total assets
of over $100 million starting from 1988.
We rely on BRD and NGR to access the bankruptcy characteristics of ﬁrms, such as bankruptcy ﬁling type, number of days from
case ﬁling to case disposition, whether the ﬁrm successfully emerged from the bankruptcy etc. In addition to the basic bankruptcy
information, we also access information on the pre-packaged/pre-negotiated bankruptcy feature, whether the ﬁrm has access to
DIP ﬁnancing, reorganization and liquidation plans from the BRD database.3.1.1. Sample selection
In the next step we match bankruptcy cases with the CSR dataset provided by MSCI ESG. After matching with MSCI ESG, we
ﬁnd 67 bankruptcy cases that have both bankruptcy related information, CSR score reported by MSCI ESG and control variables.
We also note that closer to bankruptcy ﬁling, MSCI ESG coverage of ﬁrms drops signiﬁcantly. This is because MSCI stops covering
these ﬁrms. Therefore, instead of using CSR score reported in the previous year of bankruptcy ﬁling, we also consider the CSR
score of the ﬁrm reported in the last three years of bankruptcy ﬁling. Although our sample size increases from 67 to 182, we
do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant change in our ﬁndings.3.2. Measurement of CSR variable
We use MSCI ESG database to calculate the CSR score of a ﬁrm. MSCI ESG collects ﬁrm-level data through multiple chan-
nels, including public documents, annual reports, stock exchange ﬁling, company website, media and other data sources.
This database has been used in many other studies as a proxy for ﬁrm-level CSR performance (see Jiao, 2010; El Ghoul et
al., 2011 among others) and considered as “the de-facto [CSP] research standard at the moment” (Waddock, 2003, p.369).
The coverage of MSCI ESG database has improved signiﬁcantly over time, increasing from around 650 ﬁrms in 1992 to
over 3000 ﬁrms now.
MSCI ESG rating system evaluates strengths and weakness regarding seven major qualitative areas, including Community,
Corporate Governance, Diversity, Employee Relations, Environment, Human Rights and Product using a proprietary rating system.
Within each area, a binary rating system is used, where each strength or concern rating is coded with either “1” or “0”. For example,
MSCI ESG assigns a score of “1” in the strength area if a company has a cash proﬁt-sharing program through which it has recently
made distribution to a majority of its workforce. Similarly, MSCI ESG assigns a score of “1” in the weakness area if the ﬁrm has a
history of notably poor union relations.
In order to improve the robustness of our empirical analysis, we use multiple approaches of calculating CSR score, as the ex-
tant literature is inconclusive on the best approach of calculating CSR score. For instance, Deng et al. (2013) note that one of the
popular methods of calculating CSR score is summing all the stakeholder strength scores and deducting total stakeholder weak-
ness scores from it. However, the indicators used in MSCI ESG system are not consistent as a number of variables are added and
removed over the last two decades (Deng et al., 2013; Manescu, 2009). This may lead to a biased result as the CSR scores are not
comparable over time. Therefore, following Deng et al. (2013), we construct the adjusted strength CSR score by dividing the
strength scores of each dimension by the total number of strength scores for that dimension. We use the same approach to cal-
culate the adjusted weakness score. The ﬁnal CSR score is the difference between adjusted strength score and the adjusted weak-
ness score. We label this as CSR1 score. This approach takes into account inconsistent number of indicators across years and givesPlease cite this article as: Gupta, K., Krishnamurti, C., Does corporate social responsibility engagement beneﬁt distressedﬁrms? The
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In the second alternative, we follow the approach of Manescu (2009) in which the CSR score is calculated as an average of
adjusted strength score, less adjusted weakness score across seven dimensions. The difference between Manescu (2009) and
Deng et al. (2013) is that in the latter paper, the adjusted strength score minus adjusted weakness score are added across
seven areas instead of taking an average of seven dimensions. We label this as CSR2.CSR2 ¼
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others) where the CSR score is the difference between stakeholder strength and weakness score. We label this as CSR3.CSR3 ¼
X7
j¼1
Xu jt
s¼1
strengthjs−
Xk jt
r¼1
weakness jr
0
@
1
AFinally, we calculate moral and exchange capital using a variation of the method employed by Godfrey et al. (2009).3 Moral capital
is measured by the sum of positive sores on community and diversity components. Exchange capital is computed by the sum of
positive scores on employee, governance and product quality. In order to improve comparability across years, we deﬁne Standardized
Moral Capital as the standardized sum of community and diversity dimensions of CSR. Likewise, we deﬁne Standardized Exchange
Capital as the standardized sum of governance, employee relations and product quality dimensions of CSR.
We standardize CSR1, CSR2, CSR3, moral, and exchange capital score of each ﬁrm in a year to control for intra-industry CSR
variation. This procedure addresses the concern that CSR scores across industries are not comparable. Without standardizing,
the CSR measure will be benchmarked against all ﬁrms in the sample instead of relative to other ﬁrms in the same industry.
For instance, CSR practices vary by industry and the importance of CSR is much more pronounced in certain industries, such as
in mining and chemical industry. We subtract the average CSR score of the industry (classiﬁed using the methodology of Fama
and French, 1997) from ﬁrm-level CSR and then divide by the standard deviation of the same industry.4
3.3. Measurement of other variables
Prepackage is a dummy variable taking the value of “1” if the ﬁrm has acceptance from creditors prior to ﬁling for Chapter 11
in the court. DIP indicator is a dummy variable taking the value of “1” if the ﬁrm has secured additional ﬁnancing during the pe-
riod of restructuring. Creditor dummy takes the value of “1” if an ofﬁcial committee was appointed to represent the unsecured
creditors prior to case disposition. Delaware represents a dummy variable taking the value of “1” if the case is ﬁled in Delaware.
Fraud is a dummy variable taking a value of “1” if management is suspected of committing fraud. The BRD database classiﬁes
bankruptcy driven by frauds on the following basis: “bankruptcies caused principally by fraud claims (include securities fraud
claims) against the company. These cases often began with ﬁnancial difﬁculties from other causes, which were concealed from
the investors until they were severe enough to cause the bankruptcy” (see Glossary of UCLA LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Data-
base). Log of asset is the reported total asset in the year prior to case ﬁling. Proﬁtability is net income for the year ending before
the case ﬁling. Filing rate captures the wave of bankruptcy over the sample period. It is calculated as the number of BRD ﬁlings in
the year of ﬁling. Our use of these variables follows the bankruptcy literature (Bris et al., 2006; Dahiya et al., 2003; Kalay et al.,
2007).frey et al. (2009) coded ICSR participation (a.k.a moral capital) one if the ﬁrm scored greater than zero on any of the positive items under the community or
y dimensions, zero otherwise. We use standardized total scores.
designate the industry classiﬁcation using the Fama and French methodology as FF48 industry.
e cite this article as: Gupta, K., Krishnamurti, C., Does corporate social responsibility engagement beneﬁt distressedﬁrms? The
of moral and exchange capital, Paciﬁc-Basin Finance Journal (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pacﬁn.2016.10.010
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The descriptive statistics of key variables used in the study are provided in Table 2. The three variants used in measuring CSR
engagement scores (Standardized CSR1, Standardized CSR2, and Standardized CSR3) show substantial variation and are right
skewed. The mean values are 0.009, 0.016 and 0.068 respectively. The Standardized Moral CSR has a mean of 0.185 while the
Standardized Exchange CSR has a mean of −0.123. The ﬁrms in our sample spend on average 553 days in bankruptcy. The
ﬁrms in our sample have a 46% chance of emerging from bankruptcy. About 13% of the sample ﬁrms ﬁle a prepackaged bankrupt-
cy agreement during the Chapter 11 proceedings. Approximately 65% of our sample ﬁrms are able to access DIP ﬁnancing. 88.4%
of the ﬁrms have appointed a creditors committee to deal with the bankruptcy ﬁling. Almost 45% of the sample ﬁrms ﬁle for
bankruptcy in the state of Delaware.
In Table 3, we report the correlation matrix. As expected the three measures of CSR engagement scores are highly positively
correlated with each other. Standardized Moral CSR scores are positively related with the three measures of overall CSR scores,
with correlations ranging from 0.589 to 0.672. The correlation of Standardized Exchange CSR scores with overall CSR measures
range from 0.400 to 0.531. Interestingly Moral CSR and Exchange CSR scores are negatively correlated but is not signiﬁcant.
The log of assets (size proxy) is positively correlated with Standardized CSR3 scores and Moral CSR but is negatively correlated
with Exchange CSR. The prepacked dummy is negatively correlated with Creditor dummy and positively correlated with Delaware
ﬁling dummy (Delaware) and operating proﬁtability. These results suggest that having a creditor committee reduces the chances
of concluding a prenegotiated deal. The indicator for DIP ﬁnancing is positively correlated with Creditor dummy and Delaware
indicating that having a creditor committee or ﬁling in Delaware positively inﬂuence the probability of obtaining DIP ﬁnancing.
Overall, the data do not suggest any serious problem of multicollinearity other than between the variants of the overall CSR
scores.
4. Empirical results
4.1. Key empirical results
We conduct logistic regression using emergence from bankruptcy as the dependent variable. Our results are reported in Table 4.
We ﬁnd that the standardized overall CSR scores are not statistically signiﬁcant. However, when we bifurcate CSR engagement
scores into two components – Moral CSR and Exchange CSR – we ﬁnd intuitive results. We ﬁnd that Moral CSR, i.e., Moral capital,
is positive and statistically signiﬁcant implying that ﬁrms with higher moral capital are more likely to emerge from bankruptcy,
ceteris paribus. Creditor dummy is positive and signiﬁcant indicating that the existence of a creditors committee increases the like-
lihood of a ﬁrm emerging from bankruptcy. The dummy for prepackaged bankruptcy is also positive and signiﬁcant indicating that
ﬁrms which are able to negotiate a deal with creditors prior to ﬁling Chapter 11, are more likely to successfully come out of bank-
ruptcy. Prior work suggests that the use of prepacks reduces both the time spent in bankruptcy and reorganization (Tashjian et al.,
1996; Franks and Torous, 1994). The dummy for ﬁling in Delaware is also positive and marginally statistically signiﬁcant in some
cases. The indicator variable for procuring DIP ﬁnancing is positively associated with the probability of emerging from bankruptcyTable 2
Descriptive statistics.
Variable Mean StDev PC5 PC25 PC50 PC75 PC95
Standardized CSR1 0.009 0.856 −1.196 −0.588 −0.065 0.468 1.566
Standardized CSR2 0.016 0.857 −1.196 −0.580 −0.065 0.468 1.566
Standardized CSR3 0.068 0.946 −1.421 −0.511 −0.014 0.446 1.821
Standardized Moral 0.185 0.971 −1.177 −0.644 0.011 0.784 1.830
Standardized Exchange −0.123 0.854 −1.618 −0.685 −0.091 0.556 1.043
Prepackaged 0.130 0.339 0 0 0 0 1
DIP Indicator 0.652 0.480 0 0 1 1 1
Creditor dummy 0.884 0.323 0 1 1 1 1
Delaware 0.449 0.501 0 0 0 1 1
Fraud 0.029 0.169 0 0 0 0 0
Log of Asset 7.761 1.665 5.880 6.439 7.622 8.347 10.610
Proﬁtability 0.025 0.162 −0.170 −0.033 0.040 0.095 0.144
Filing Rate 47.275 30.743 13 24 35 91 97
In Table 2 we provide descriptive statistics of key variables. CSR1 score is the difference between adjusted strength score and the adjusted weakness score. CSR2
score is calculated as an average of adjusted strength score, less adjusted weakness score across seven dimensions. CSR3 score is the difference between stakehold-
er strength and weakness score. We calculate moral capital as sum of positive sores on community and diversity components. Exchange capital is captured by
positive scores on employee, governance and product quality. We subtract the average CSR score of the industry (classiﬁed using Fama and French, 1997 48 in-
dustry classiﬁcation) from ﬁrm-level CSR and then divide by the standard deviation of the same FF48 industry to standardize CSR1, CSR2, CSR3, moral, and ex-
change capital score of each ﬁrm. Prepackage is a dummy variable taking the value of “1” if the ﬁrm has acceptance from creditors previous to ﬁling the case
in the court. DIP indicator is a dummy variable taking the value of “1” if the ﬁrm has secured additional ﬁnancing during the period of restructuring. Creditor
dummy takes the value of “1” if an ofﬁcial committee was appointed to represent the unsecured creditors prior to case disposition. Delaware represents a
dummy variable taking the value of “1” if the case is ﬁled in Delaware. Fraud is a dummy variable taking a value of “1” if management is suspected of committing
fraud. Log of asset is the reported total asset last year before case ﬁling. Proﬁtability is Net income for last year ending before case ﬁling. Filing rate captures the
wave of bankruptcy over the sample period. It is calculated as the number of BRD ﬁlings in the year of ﬁling.
Please cite this article as: Gupta, K., Krishnamurti, C., Does corporate social responsibility engagement beneﬁt distressedﬁrms? The
role of moral and exchange capital, Paciﬁc-Basin Finance Journal (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pacﬁn.2016.10.010
Table 3
Correlation coefﬁcient.
Standardized
CSR1
Standardized
CSR2
Standardized
CSR3
Standardized
Moral
Standardized
Exchange Prepackaged
DIP
Indicator
Creditor
Dummy Delaware Fraud
Log of
Asset Proﬁtability
Filing
Rate
Standardized CSR1 1
Standardized CSR2 0.987*** 1
Standardized CSR3 0.938*** 0.939*** 1
Standardized Moral 0.589*** 0.627*** 0.672*** 1
Standardized
Exchange
0.522*** 0.531*** 0.400*** −0.218 1
Prepackaged 0.151 0.195 0.143 0.273* 0.0310 1
DIP indicator 0.189 0.176 0.171 0.0246 0.187 0.0303 1
Creditor dummy −0.0559 −0.103 −0.0395 −0.187 0.0105 −0.447*** 0.0919** 1
Delaware −0.123 −0.0976 −0.145 −0.0201 −0.0818 0.117*** 0.223*** −0.0657* 1
Fraud 0.149 0.148 0.141 0.0957 0.0652 −0.0376 0.0161 0.0366 −0.0113 1
Log of Asset 0.154 0.156 0.333** 0.425*** −0.251* −0.0377 0.0640* 0.0847** −0.0183 0.0263 1
Proﬁtability −0.137 −0.133 −0.121 0.128 −0.271* 0.0971** 0.0787* −0.0250 0.0312 0.0387 0.0201 1
Filing Rate 0.120 0.112 0.0948 0.0473 0.0745 0.0145 0.213*** 0.0729* 0.136*** 0.0195 0.150*** −0.0871* 1
In Table 3, we report the correlation matrix. CSR1 score is the difference between adjusted strength score and the adjusted weakness score. CSR2 score is calculated as an average of adjusted strength score, less adjusted
weakness score across seven dimensions. CSR3 score is the difference between stakeholder strength and weakness score. We calculate moral capital as sum of positive sores on community and diversity components. Ex-
change capital is captured by positive scores on employee, governance and product quality. We subtract the average CSR score of the industry (classiﬁed using Fama and French, 1997 48 industry classiﬁcation) from ﬁrm-
level CSR and then divide by the standard deviation of the same FF48 industry to standardize CSR1, CSR2, CSR3, moral, and exchange capital score of each ﬁrm. Prepackage is a dummy variable taking the value of “1” if the
ﬁrm has acceptance from creditors previous to ﬁling the case in the court. DIP indicator is a dummy variable taking the value of “1” if the ﬁrm has secured additional ﬁnancing during the period of restructuring. Creditor
dummy takes the value of “1” if an ofﬁcial committee was appointed to represent the unsecured creditors prior to case disposition. Delaware represents a dummy variable taking the value of “1” if the case is ﬁled in
Delaware. Fraud is a dummy variable taking a value of “1” if management is suspected of committing fraud. Log of asset is the reported total asset last year before case ﬁling. Proﬁtability is Net income for last year ending
before case ﬁling. Filing rate captures the wave of bankruptcy over the sample period. It is calculated as the number of BRD ﬁlings in the year of ﬁling.
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Table 4
Emergence from Chapter 11.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Emerge Emerge Emerge Emerge Emerge
Standardized CSR1 0.0244
(0.08)
Standardized CSR2 −0.0120
(−0.04)
Standardized CSR3 0.0312
(0.09)
Standardized Moral 0.646**
(1.99)
Standardized Exchange −0.379
(−0.85)
Creditor dummy 14.23*** 14.24*** 14.20*** 14.85*** 14.29***
(18.76) (18.62) (18.42) (19.10) (16.15)
Prepackaged 16.41*** 16.42*** 16.43*** 16.27*** 16.23***
(22.29) (22.24) (21.27) (19.22) (21.12)
Delaware 1.028* 1.022* 1.140* 0.954 0.910
(1.77) (1.77) (1.94) (1.58) (1.54)
Fraud 0.325 0.333 0.409 0.601 0.537
(0.20) (0.20) (0.26) (0.44) (0.33)
DIP indicator 1.133* 1.153* 1.072 1.084 1.337*
(1.64) (1.71) (1.53) (1.57) (1.86)
Log of Asset −0.0397 −0.0363 −0.0432 −0.272 −0.114
(−0.24) (−0.23) (−0.26) (−1.40) (−0.56)
Proﬁtability 0.528 0.490 0.481 0.0868 −0.165
(0.26) (0.24) (0.24) (0.05) (−0.09)
Filing Rate 0.00560 0.00573 0.00685 0.00450 0.00633
(0.61) (0.63) (0.75) (0.47) (0.68)
Constant −15.82*** −15.86*** −15.88*** −14.54*** −15.45***
(−9.33) (−9.47) (−8.78) (−8.05) (−8.50)
N 67 67 66 67 66
pseudo R-sq 0.191 0.191 0.201 0.226 0.189
In Table 4 we report logistic regression using emergence from bankruptcy as the dependent variable. CSR1 score is the difference between adjusted strength score
and the adjusted weakness score. CSR2 score is calculated as an average of adjusted strength score, less adjusted weakness score across seven dimensions. CSR3
score is the difference between stakeholder strength and weakness score. We calculate moral capital as sum of positive sores on community and diversity com-
ponents. Exchange capital is captured by positive scores on employee, governance and product quality. We subtract the average CSR score of the industry (clas-
siﬁed using Fama and French, 1997 48 industry classiﬁcation) from ﬁrm-level CSR and then divide by the standard deviation of the same FF48 industry to
standardize CSR1, CSR2, CSR3, moral, and exchange capital score of each ﬁrm. Prepackage is a dummy variable taking the value of “1” if the ﬁrm has acceptance
from creditors previous to ﬁling the case in the court. DIP indicator is a dummy variable taking the value of “1” if the ﬁrm has secured additional ﬁnancing during
the period of restructuring. Creditor dummy takes the value of “1” if an ofﬁcial committee was appointed to represent the unsecured creditors prior to case dis-
position. Delaware represents a dummy variable taking the value of “1” if the case is ﬁled in Delaware. Fraud is a dummy variable taking a value of “1” if man-
agement is suspected of committing fraud. Log of asset is the reported total asset last year before case ﬁling. Proﬁtability is Net income for last year ending before
case ﬁling. Filing rate captures the wave of bankruptcy over the sample period. It is calculated as the number of BRD ﬁlings in the year of ﬁling. * statistically sig-
niﬁcant at the 10%, ** statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% and *** statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. t-Stats are given in parenthesis and are based on robust stan-
dard errors.
9K. Gupta, C. Krishnamurti / Paciﬁc-Basin Finance Journal xxx (2016) xxx–xxxand is marginally signiﬁcant, consistent with prior work (Dahiya et al., 2003). Overall, our results support Hypothesis 1, which
states that a ﬁrm with positive moral capital is more likely to emerge from bankruptcy, ceteris paribus.
In Table 5, we provide results of regressing the time spent in bankruptcy (number of days from case ﬁling to disposition) on
CSR engagement and a number of important control variables. The standardized CSR scores have no impact on the time spent in
bankruptcy. However, the moral capital component of CSR has a signiﬁcantly negative inﬂuence on days spent in bankruptcy even
after accounting for several control variables. This result supports our Hypothesis 2, which posits that the time spent in bankrupt-
cy will be shorter for ﬁrms that engage in CSR activities that generate moral capital compared to ﬁrms that do not. Firms, which
successfully pre-negotiate a deal with creditors, spend lesser time in bankruptcy compared to other ﬁrms. Large ﬁrms typically
spend more time in bankruptcy compared to smaller ﬁrms ostensibly due to the complexity of their operations arising out of
their size. These results are consistent with prior work (Singhal and Zhu, 2013).
We examine the determinants of ﬁling a prepackaged bankruptcy using a logistic regression framework. The results, reported
in Table 6, indicate that some versions of standardized CSR scores have a positive impact on the likelihood of successfully nego-
tiating a prepackaged deal. When we examine the two components of CSR engagement, we ﬁnd that the moral capital component
has a positive impact and is weakly statistically signiﬁcant. The exchange capital component of CSR is not statistically signiﬁcant.
Overall, we ﬁnd weak support for Hypothesis 3, which states that ﬁrms that engage in CSR activities that generate moral capital
are more likely to ﬁle a prepackaged plan at the time of ﬁling for Chapter 11 compared to ﬁrms that do not. Interestingly, having a
credit committee is negatively associated with the likelihood of concluding a pre-negotiated agreement with creditors. Also, large
ﬁrms have a lower chance of closing a pre-negotiated deal with creditors. These ﬁndings indicate the severity of holdout problems
when credit committees exist and in large ﬁrms.Please cite this article as: Gupta, K., Krishnamurti, C., Does corporate social responsibility engagement beneﬁt distressedﬁrms? The
role of moral and exchange capital, Paciﬁc-Basin Finance Journal (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pacﬁn.2016.10.010
Table 5
Days in bankruptcy.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DaysIn DaysIn DaysIn DaysIn DaysIn
Standardized CSR1 −129.5
(−1.13)
Standardized CSR2 −129.6
(−1.12)
Standardized CSR3 −130.9
(−1.10)
Standardized Moral −141.3**
(−1.99)
Standardized Exchange −71.76
(−0.77)
Creditor dummy 158.7* 148.4 172.7* 160.0 151.3
(1.90) (1.64) (1.94) (0.59) (1.46)
Prepackaged −221.6*** −211.4** −183.5* −98.03 −291.1**
(−2.75) (−2.53) (−1.97) (−0.34) (−2.43)
Delaware 10.02 17.15 18.13 56.98 14.95
(0.08) (0.14) (0.15) (0.45) (0.12)
Fraud 288.2 291.6 250.2 218.6 299.1
(0.80) (0.81) (0.70) (0.56) (0.77)
DIP Indicator 181.4 177.9 181.7 134.0 151.6
(1.14) (1.13) (1.08) (0.98) (1.02)
Log of Asset 117.8*** 119.0*** 135.4*** 154.1*** 94.29***
(3.72) (3.67) (3.05) (3.20) (4.46)
Proﬁtability −148.9 −139.9 −162.5 100.1 −130.0
(−0.98) (−0.93) (−1.08) (0.25) (−0.78)
Filing Rate 3.097 3.084 3.160 2.931 2.774
(0.86) (0.85) (0.88) (1.42) (0.79)
Constant −740.6* −741.2* −895.9 −995.6* −520.5*
(−1.70) (−1.69) (−1.60) (−1.99) (−1.92)
N 67 67 66 67 66
adj. R-sq 0.190 0.190 0.194 0.197 0.148
In Table 5 we regress the time spent in bankruptcy (number of days from case ﬁling to disposition) on CSR engagement. CSR1 score is the difference between
adjusted strength score and the adjusted weakness score. CSR2 score is calculated as an average of adjusted strength score, less adjusted weakness score across
seven dimensions. CSR3 score is the difference between stakeholder strength and weakness score. We calculate moral capital as sum of positive sores on commu-
nity and diversity components. Exchange capital is captured by positive scores on employee, governance and product quality. We subtract the average CSR score of
the industry (classiﬁed using Fama and French, 1997 48 industry classiﬁcation) from ﬁrm-level CSR and then divide by the standard deviation of the same FF48
industry to standardize CSR1, CSR2, CSR3, moral, and exchange capital score of each ﬁrm. Prepackage is a dummy variable taking the value of “1” if the ﬁrm has
acceptance from creditors previous to ﬁling the case in the court. DIP indicator is a dummy variable taking the value of “1” if the ﬁrm has secured additional ﬁ-
nancing during the period of restructuring. Creditor dummy takes the value of “1” if an ofﬁcial committee was appointed to represent the unsecured creditors prior
to case disposition. Delaware represents a dummy variable taking the value of “1” if the case is ﬁled in Delaware. Fraud is a dummy variable taking a value of “1” if
management is suspected of committing fraud. Log of asset is the reported total asset last year before case ﬁling. Proﬁtability is Net income for last year ending
before case ﬁling. Filing rate captures the wave of bankruptcy over the sample period. It is calculated as the number of BRD ﬁlings in the year of ﬁling. * statistically
signiﬁcant at the 10%, ** statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% and *** statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. t-Stats are given in parenthesis and are based on robust
standard errors.
10 K. Gupta, C. Krishnamurti / Paciﬁc-Basin Finance Journal xxx (2016) xxx–xxxFinally, we examine the determinants of DIP ﬁnancing and provide the results in Table 7. Firms with higher CSR engagement
scores are more likely to obtain DIP ﬁnancing even after controlling for other key determinants. Interestingly, the moral capital
component is not signiﬁcant but the exchange capital component is positive and highly signiﬁcant. This ﬁnding is interesting es-
pecially in the light of additional protection that DIP ﬁnancing typically provides in the US setting. Our ﬁnding supports
Hypothesis 4 which states that ﬁrms which engage in CSR activities that generate exchange capital are more likely to obtain
DIP ﬁnancing compared to ﬁrms that do not. The only control variable that is signiﬁcant is the measure of operating income.
4.2. Robustness checks
We conduct additional robustness checks to alleviate potential concerns with our empirical results. The ﬁrst concern is the
sample selection bias. We examine whether the ﬁrms that are included in the sample are non-randomly selected and are there-
fore not representative of the full sample. We use Heckman (1979) two-step procedure to generate Inverse Mills ratio. More spe-
ciﬁcally, in the ﬁrst step we generate a dummy taking the value equal to one if the ﬁrm has a CSR score and reported bankruptcy
in the following year. Firms that have CSR score but not reported to be in bankruptcy are coded as zero. Next, we regress the
dummy variable on the set of control variables and save the residual term. Subsequently we transform the residual term to In-
verse Mills ratio and use as an additional control variable in the mainline regression. These results, which are tabulated in
Table 8, suggest that our main ﬁndings remain qualitatively similar after controlling for potential sample selection-bias.
The second concern that requires attention is the small size of the sample. This is an inherent problem in our data sources. We
approach this issue in three ways. First, we code CSR scores (Moral Capital and Exchange Capital) as zero if a ﬁrm is missing in thePlease cite this article as: Gupta, K., Krishnamurti, C., Does corporate social responsibility engagement beneﬁt distressedﬁrms? The
role of moral and exchange capital, Paciﬁc-Basin Finance Journal (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pacﬁn.2016.10.010
Table 6
Prepackaged or prenegotiated bankruptcy.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Prepackaged Prepackaged Prepackaged Prepackaged Prepackaged
Standardized CSR1 0.759
(1.59)
Standardized CSR2 0.886**
(2.01)
Standardized CSR3 0.877*
(1.83)
Standardized Moral 3.159*
(1.92)
Standardized Exchange −0.186
(−0.32)
Creditor dummy −5.638*** −5.476*** −5.469*** −5.327*** −5.379***
(−3.33) (−3.32) (−3.42) (−3.60) (−3.26)
Delaware 0.943 0.776 0.815 −0.614 0.564
(0.91) (0.80) (0.85) (−0.65) (0.52)
DIP Indicator −0.858 −0.780 −0.892 −1.085 −0.221
(−0.84) (−0.78) (−0.71) (−0.58) (−0.27)
Log of Asset −1.590** −1.604** −1.572** −2.412*** −1.401**
(−2.39) (−2.27) (−2.47) (−3.46) (−2.46)
Proﬁtability 2.317 2.342 2.405 1.006 0.905
(1.26) (1.30) (1.05) (0.43) (0.74)
Filing Rate 0.0113 0.0100 0.00962 0.00220 0.0150
(0.74) (0.62) (0.64) (0.12) (1.57)
Constant 12.28*** 12.30*** 12.20*** 17.78*** 10.58***
(2.82) (2.67) (3.07) (3.76) (2.67)
N 67 67 66 67 66
pseudo R-sq 0.607 0.613 0.611 0.708 0.559
In Table 6 we examine the determinants of ﬁling a prepackaged bankruptcy using a logistic regression framework. CSR1 score is the difference between adjusted
strength score and the adjusted weakness score. CSR2 score is calculated as an average of adjusted strength score, less adjusted weakness score across seven di-
mensions. CSR3 score is the difference between stakeholder strength and weakness score. We calculate moral capital as sum of positive sores on community and
diversity components. Exchange capital is captured by positive scores on employee, governance and product quality. We subtract the average CSR score of the in-
dustry (classiﬁed using Fama and French, 1997 48 industry classiﬁcation) from ﬁrm-level CSR and then divide by the standard deviation of the same FF48 industry
to standardize CSR1, CSR2, CSR3, moral, and exchange capital score of each ﬁrm. Prepackage is a dummy variable taking the value of “1” if the ﬁrm has acceptance
from creditors previous to ﬁling the case in the court. DIP indicator is a dummy variable taking the value of “1” if the ﬁrm has secured additional ﬁnancing during
the period of restructuring. Creditor dummy takes the value of “1” if an ofﬁcial committee was appointed to represent the unsecured creditors prior to case dis-
position. Delaware represents a dummy variable taking the value of “1” if the case is ﬁled in Delaware. Fraud is a dummy variable taking a value of “1” if man-
agement is suspected of committing fraud. Log of asset is the reported total asset last year before case ﬁling. Proﬁtability is Net income for last year ending before
case ﬁling. Filing rate captures the wave of bankruptcy over the sample period. It is calculated as the number of BRD ﬁlings in the year of ﬁling. * statistically sig-
niﬁcant at the 10%, ** statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% and *** statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. t-Stats are given in parenthesis and are based on robust stan-
dard errors.
11K. Gupta, C. Krishnamurti / Paciﬁc-Basin Finance Journal xxx (2016) xxx–xxxMSCI ESG database but has other data available before the bankruptcy ﬁling. This increases the sample to 849. We run our base-
line regressions (Table 4) using this expanded sample. We also address the sample selection problem by using the Inverse Mills
Ratio. The results are reported in Table 8. Our key result, viz.,that moral capital increases the probability of a Chapter 11 ﬁrm
emerging from bankruptcy is once again supported. As before, exchange capital continues to be insigniﬁcant.
In the second approach, we increase the sample size to 182 based on the CSR scores recorded in any of the last three years
preceding bankruptcy. Our results are qualitatively similar. In the third approach, we use available CSR scores and the determi-
nants of CSR to ﬁnd the predicted CSR score. This procedure generates the predicted CSR score of ﬁrms that are initially covered
by MSCI ESG but later discontinued. We ﬁnd that the sample size increases when we substitute predicted CSR score in place of
actual score but our baseline results (unreported) remain strong.5
Finally, we address the concern that our measures of moral and exchange capital differ from the measures used by Godfrey et
al. (2009). We used standardized total scores of these CSR dimensions, whereas Godfrey et al. (2009) only required a positive
score on one of the dimensions. Thus the Godfrey method would provide a maximum value of one for moral and exchange cap-
ital, whereas our measure could potentially increase over time. We replicate all our key tests using the approach followed by
Godfrey et al. (2009). Our results remain qualitatively similar.6
5. Concluding remarks
The current study extends the CSR-risk linkage further by examining the effects of CSR engagement on distressed ﬁrms. When
a ﬁrm is already in a state of ﬁnancial distress, it is not clear ex-ante whether a ﬁrm's socially responsible behavior will facilitate
its emergence from bankruptcy. One line of argument is that a ﬁrm in distress should not fritter away its precious resources by5 Both the results are available from the authors on request.
6 These are untabulated, but are available from the authors on request.
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Table 7
DIP ﬁnancing.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DIP indicator DIP indicator DIP indicator DIP indicator DIP indicator
Standardized CSR1 0.903**
(2.48)
Standardized CSR2 0.851**
(2.34)
Standardized CSR3 0.851***
(2.58)
Standardized Moral 0.0946
(0.29)
Standardized Exchange 0.948***
(2.91)
Creditor dummy 1.068 1.144 0.904 0.961 1.256
(0.80) (0.88) (0.70) (0.81) (0.99)
Prepackaged −0.0952 −0.173 −0.306 0.182 0.512
(−0.06) (−0.10) (−0.19) (0.12) (0.30)
Delaware 0.850 0.777 0.834 0.526 0.930
(1.35) (1.23) (1.29) (0.86) (1.34)
Log of Asset −0.213 −0.217 −0.318 −0.168 0.00736
(−0.87) (−0.90) (−1.35) (−0.79) (0.04)
Proﬁtability 7.191** 7.045** 6.809*** 6.045** 7.824***
(2.56) (2.51) (2.65) (2.22) (2.58)
Filing Rate −0.00957 −0.00946 −0.00763 −0.00748 −0.00993
(−0.95) (−0.95) (−0.76) (−0.80) (−1.00)
Constant 1.385 1.365 2.216 1.046 −0.474
(0.55) (0.56) (0.91) (0.45) (−0.22)
N 67 67 66 67 66
pseudo R-sq 0.178 0.171 0.175 0.115 0.178
In Table 7 we examine the determinants of DIP ﬁnancing using a logistic regression framework. CSR1 score is the difference between adjusted strength score and
the adjusted weakness score. CSR2 score is calculated as an average of adjusted strength score, less adjusted weakness score across seven dimensions. CSR3 score is
the difference between stakeholder strength and weakness score. We calculate moral capital as sum of positive sores on community and diversity components.
Exchange capital is captured by positive scores on employee, governance and product quality. We subtract the average CSR score of the industry (classiﬁed
using Fama and French, 1997 48 industry classiﬁcation) from ﬁrm-level CSR and then divide by the standard deviation of the same FF48 industry to standardize
CSR1, CSR2, CSR3, moral, and exchange capital score of each ﬁrm. Prepackage is a dummy variable taking the value of “1” if the ﬁrm has acceptance from creditors
previous to ﬁling the case in the court. DIP indicator is a dummy variable taking the value of “1” if the ﬁrm has secured additional ﬁnancing during the period of
restructuring. Creditor dummy takes the value of “1” if an ofﬁcial committee was appointed to represent the unsecured creditors prior to case disposition. Dela-
ware represents a dummy variable taking the value of “1” if the case is ﬁled in Delaware. Fraud is a dummy variable taking a value of “1” if management is
suspected of committing fraud. Log of asset is the reported total asset last year before case ﬁling. Proﬁtability is Net income for last year ending before case ﬁling.
Filing rate captures the wave of bankruptcy over the sample period. It is calculated as the number of BRD ﬁlings in the year of ﬁling. * statistically signiﬁcant at the
10%, ** statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% and *** statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. t-Stats are given in parenthesis and are based on robust standard errors.
12 K. Gupta, C. Krishnamurti / Paciﬁc-Basin Finance Journal xxx (2016) xxx–xxxspending it on community, charitable activities, and the environment. It should rather focus its resources on activities that reward
its primary stakeholders, such as creditors and shareholders. Alternately, one could argue that a ﬁrm's ability to survive a period of
ﬁnancial distress depends on a broad group of stakeholders and they would take cognizance of its prior commitment and willing-
ness to engage in socially responsible activities, such as community engagement and diversity.
In our empirical tests, we use the framework outlined in Godfrey (2005) and Godfrey et al. (2009) and partition CSR engage-
ment into two segments – moral capital and exchange capital. The moral capital component of a ﬁrm signals the willingness of a
ﬁrm to act altruistically; while the exchange capital indicates a ﬁrm's ability to create more advantageous exchanges between the
ﬁrm and its primary stakeholders. Our research, which is based on US ﬁrms that have ﬁled for bankruptcy protection under Chap-
ter 11, shows that a ﬁrm's prior CSR engagement helps it to emerge from bankruptcy. In particular, we ﬁnd that the moral capital
component of CSR is positively associated with the probability of a Chapter 11 ﬁrm emerging from bankruptcy and reduces the
time spent in bankruptcy. Further, the moral capital component of CSR increases the likelihood of a distressed ﬁrm closing a
prenegotiated settlement with its creditors prior to a formal Chapter 11 ﬁling. Finally, our results indicate that CSR engagement
increases the chance of a distressed ﬁrm obtaining DIP ﬁnancing. Since prior literature on bankruptcy shows that concluding a
prenegotiated settlement and procuring debtor-in-possession ﬁnancing are key determinants of a Chapter 11 ﬁrm successfully
emerging from bankruptcy, it appears that CSR engagement plays a crucial role in ensuring its survival. In the context of Chapter
11, it appears that both moral capital and exchange capital play vital roles in facilitating a ﬁrm's successful emergence from bank-
ruptcy. While exchange capital is crucial as it is associated with a ﬁrm's ability to seek extra capital in the form of DIP ﬁnancing,
moral capital is shown to be associated with successful conclusion of a prepack, reduction in time spent in bankruptcy and the
overall probability of emerging from bankruptcy.
Our work contributes to two distinct strands of literature. First, management scholars such as Godfrey (2005) and Fombrun et
al. (2000) suggest that CSR provides an insurance like protection when a ﬁrm is subject to negative events. They posit that stake-
holders mete out punishments based on the perceived state of mind and intention of the offender. The state of mind is assessed
using the mens rea determination in law (LaFave, 2000). It is in this context that Godfrey et al. (2009) provides empirical evidence
that the moral capital derived from CSR engagement provides a mitigating inﬂuence reducing the intensity of adverse stock pricePlease cite this article as: Gupta, K., Krishnamurti, C., Does corporate social responsibility engagement beneﬁt distressedﬁrms? The
role of moral and exchange capital, Paciﬁc-Basin Finance Journal (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pacﬁn.2016.10.010
Table 8
Robustness checks.
B20
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Emerge Emerge Emerge Emerge
Standardized Moral 1.005**
(2.30)
Standardized Exchange −0.537
(−1.16)
Moral All Firms 1.169**
(2.15)
Exchange All Firms −0.267
(−0.54)
Inverse Mills Ratio −26.29** −17.09** −2.963* −2.433
(−2.17) (−2.07) (−1.71) (−1.48)
Creditor dummy 19.10*** 17.47*** 0.381 0.317
(8.71) (10.88) (0.98) (0.83)
Prepackaged 15.73*** 16.51*** 1.441*** 1.461***
(14.77) (18.91) (5.63) (5.69)
Delaware −0.657 −0.153 −0.409* −0.394*
(−0.59) (−0.18) (−1.84) (−1.82)
Fraud 8.317** 5.048* 0.676 0.521
(2.12) (1.70) (0.96) (0.76)
DIP indicator −7.468** −4.097 −0.573 −0.414
(−2.05) (−1.53) (−0.92) (−0.70)
Log of Asset −7.713** −4.766** −0.867* −0.704
(−2.24) (−2.06) (−1.69) (−1.46)
Proﬁtability 9.997** 6.132* 2.225** 2.072*
(2.37) (1.85) (1.96) (1.80)
Filing Rate 0.0750** 0.0538** −0.00248 −0.00324
(2.47) (2.24) (−0.44) (−0.60)
Constant 71.64* 38.64 10.85* 8.940
(1.81) (1.44) (1.85) (1.61)
N 67 66 849 849
pseudo R-sq 0.310 0.251 0.097 0.092
In Table 8 we undertake robustness checks. In Model 1 and 2 we examine whether the ﬁrms that are included in the sample are non-randomly selected and are
therefore not representative of the full sample. We use Heckman (1979) two-step procedure to generate Inverse Mills ratio. In Model 3 and Model 4, we address
small sample size concern. We code CSR scores (Moral Capital and Exchange Capital) as zero if a ﬁrm is missing in the MSCI ESG database but has other data avail-
able before the bankruptcy ﬁling. We also address the sample selection problem by using the Inverse Mills Ratio in Model 3 and Model 4. Prepackage is a dummy
variable taking the value of “1” if the ﬁrm has acceptance from creditors previous to ﬁling the case in the court. DIP indicator is a dummy variable taking the value
of “1” if the ﬁrm has secured additional ﬁnancing during the period of restructuring. Creditor dummy takes the value of “1” if an ofﬁcial committee was appointed
to represent the unsecured creditors prior to case disposition. Delaware represents a dummy variable taking the value of “1” if the case is ﬁled in Delaware. Fraud
is a dummy variable taking a value of “1” if management is suspected of committing fraud. Log of asset is the reported total asset last year before case ﬁling. Prof-
itability is Net income for last year ending before case ﬁling. Filing rate captures the wave of bankruptcy over the sample period. It is calculated as the number of
BRD ﬁlings in the year of ﬁling. * statistically signiﬁcant at the 10%, ** statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% and *** statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. t-Stats are
given in parenthesis and are based on robust standard errors.
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the context of a ﬁrm under bankruptcy ﬁling. No prior works have examined the role of CSR, speciﬁcally moral capital of a ﬁrm
whilst in Chapter 11 ﬁling. While the mitigating effect of moral capital reported in Godfrey et al. (2009) is short-term in nature, in
our setting, we show the long-term effects associated with a ﬁrm's emergence from bankruptcy. Further, our setting involves mul-
tiple stakeholders – both primary and secondary while the empirical setting of Godfrey et al. (2009) only includes primary stake-
holders (shareholders).
Our second contribution is to the bankruptcy literature. While several economic and ﬁnancial variables have been identiﬁed in
the prior literature, none have used CSR engagement. By showing the link between CSR engagement and emergence from bank-
ruptcy, our results shows the relevance of non-ﬁnancial factors that facilitate a ﬁrm's successful exit from bankruptcy proceedings.
A primary insight from our paper is the ﬁnding that CSR engagement targeting primary and secondary stakeholders are both rel-
evant and crucial factors that help explain why some ﬁrms emerge from Chapter 11 proceedings while others do not.
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